CAVEAT LENDER:
THE MIDLANTIC DECISION AND
ITS PROGENY
By: A. Dennis Terrell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 27, 1986, the United States Supreme Court declared, pursuant to section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code,' that a
trustee in bankruptcy could not abandon an estate's concededly
burdensome property without spending estate assets to correct
immediate and identifiable environmental problems. 2 Although
one of the issues certified by the Supreme Court involved a secured creditor's claim of an unconstitutional taking of collateral,
the Court limited its decision to whether the trustee's power to
abandon property under section 554 was impliedly conditioned
upon compliance with environmental regulations.'
By affirming two lower court opinions, this decision may
have a resounding effect on financial institutions in our environmentally sensitive society. In New York v. Quanta Resources Corp.
(In re Quanta Resources Corp. )4 and in a companion case brought
by New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP),' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
trustee administering the liquidation of an estate must bring the
* Member of the firm of Shanley & Fisher, P.C., Morristown, New Jersey. B.A.
Hamilton College; L.L.B. University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Terrell appeared on behalf of petitioner, Midlantic National Bank, in Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
1 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982) amended by II U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. 11 1984). Subsection (a) of the 1982 statute stated that:
After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). The 1984 amendment merely added the term "and benefit" after "value" in § 554(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
2 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
507 (1986). The case involved the presence of environmentally hazardous waste oil
on the bankrupt's property. Id. at 497.
3 Id. at 496.
4 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), aff dsub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
5 In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
.\JDEP],aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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property into compliance with health and safety regulations prior
to abandonment.6 In both cases the court of appeals denied the
trustee permission to abandon certain hazardous, albeit worthless, property and ordered the trustee to expend estate funds to
safeguard the environment. Although the money used for the
environmental cleanup had been earmarked for private creditors,
as a result of these holdings, the creditors recovered nothing.
The court of appeals concluded that this outcome was not viola7
tive of the taking clause of the fifth amendment.
In order to address the issue of a trustee's abandonment
power under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a), as well as the constitutionality
of taking property without just compensation, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.' The Court's
resolution of these issues has had a direct bearing on the degree
of risk that members of the financial community are willing to
incur when making loans to companies whose operations are potentially hazardous to the environment.
This article will discuss the history of the Quanta Resources
Corporation, its bankruptcy proceedings and trace the path by
which the dispute reached the Supreme Court. The analysis will
then focus upon the arguments of the three primary parties implicated in the Quanta cases: the bankruptcy trustee, the state environmental groups and Midlantic National Bank, Quanta's
secured creditor. Finally, the article will analyze the Supreme
Court opinion in light of subsequent decisions which have attempted to apply the Midlantic holding in varying factual
circumstances.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was formed as a
Delaware corporation in March of 1980 and shortly thereafter acquired a waste oil treatment facility from Hudson Oil Refining
Corporation in Long Island City, New York. 9 In July of 1980,
Quanta entered into an agreement to acquire Edgewater Terminal, Inc. and its lease which authorized the operation of a waste
6 New York v. Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 921-23; NJDEP, 739 F.2d
at 928-29.
7 New York v. Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 922 n. 11.
8 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). The two cases were consolidated at the Supreme

Court level. See supra notes 4-5.
9 Brief for Petitioner Midlantic National Bank at 6, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 84-801) [hereinafter
Midlantic Brief].
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oil recovery business in Edgewater, New Jersey. !° Pursuant to
this agreement, the NJDEP issued a temporary operating authorization, allowing Quanta to operate the Edgewater facility." On
June 3, 1981 Midlantic National Bank provided Quanta with a
$600,000 working capital loan secured by various items of
Quanta's Edgewater property, including the waste oil inventory.2 The New York property was not involved since it was already heavily mortgaged. Shortly after Quanta received the
Midlantic loan, the NJDEP discovered that a considerable
amount of waste oil stored at both the New York and New Jersey
sites was contaminated with unlawful concentrations of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).' 3 Quanta ceased operations
at the two facilities. 14
Quanta took immediate steps to remove the contaminated
oil from each of the facilities.' 5 Despite locating out-of-state incineration facilities where the contaminated oil could be properly
consumed, the parties could not reach an agreement for the loading and movement of the contaminated oil in New Jersey.' 6 As a
result, on October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a voluntary petition for
reorganization under chapter eleven of the Bankruptcy Code,
and continued negotiations with the NJDEP for removal of the
contaminated waste oil from New Jersey. 17 When the parties
could not reach an agreement, Quanta converted the chapter
eleven petition to a chapter seven liquidation proceeding on No-

10 Petition of Midlantic National Bank for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 3, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985) (No. 84-801) [hereinafter
Petition of Midlantic].
I Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
12 Id.
13 Id. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the inventory at the Edgewater facility
included approximately 3.5 to 5.0 million gallons of waste oil, of which approximately 400,000 gallons were contaminated with PCBs. See id. The inventory at the
Long Island City facility included approximately 500,000 gallons of waste oil, of
which approximately 70,000 gallons were contaminated with PCBs. See Response in
Opposition to Petition of Midlantic National Bank for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 2-3, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985) [hereinafter NJDEP
Response Brief].
14 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497. The temporary operating authorization under
which Quanta operated the waste oil recovery business in Edgewater prohibited
storing PCBs at this facility. Thus, at NJDEP's request, Quanta ceased operations
at the New Jersey site on July 2, 1981. Midlantic Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
15 Petition of Midlantic, supra note 10, at 4.
16 See NJDEP Response Brief, supra note 13, at 2.
17 Midlantic Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
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vember 12, 1981.18
A.

New York

From the onset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee
was required to maintain, at a cost in excess of $1,100 per week,
twenty-four hour guard service at the deteriorating New York facility. 9 Unable to sell the virtually worthless property at this site
and desirous to rid the estate of the security expense, the trustee
issued a notice of proposed abandonment to Quanta's creditors.20 In response to this notice, the State and City of New York
filed objections with the bankruptcy court maintaining that the
trustee's abandonment of the Long Island City facility would ef2
fectively place the burden of the cleanup on the State and City. '
On June 22, 1982 the bankruptcy court ruled that the trustee
could abandon the facility and denied New York's motion to designate governmental cleanup funds as a first lien on the property. 22 New York appealed this holding to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. In a memorandum
opinion, the Honorable Frederick B. Lacey affirmed the decision
of the bankruptcy court.23 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
held that the trustee would violate state environmental laws if he
were permitted to abandon the PCB laden oil at the Long Island
24
City facility.

It left to the bankruptcy court the issue of whether

the monies the state and city expended on cleanup were entitled
to administrative expense priority.25
B.

New Jersey

Prior to the bankruptcy filing, the NJDEP issued an adminis18 AJDEP, 739 F.2d at 928. On that same day, ThomasJ. O'Neill was designated
as the Quanta trustee. Petition of Midlantic, supra note 10, at 4.
19 Brief for Petitioner Thomas J. O'Neill, Trustee at 5, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for
Trustee].

20

Id.

New York v. O'Neill (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 55 Bankr. 696 (D.NJ.
1983) (mem.), rev'd sub nom. New York v. Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1984), aff'd. sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
22 ONeUll, 55 Bankr. at 699.
23 Id. By the time the appeal was heard, the State and City of New York had
expended $2.5 million cleaning up the Long Island City site. Id. at 697.
24 New York v. Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 913.
25 Id. at 922-23.
21
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trative order requiring Quanta to cleanup all hazardous materials
at the Edgewater site.26 Since executing this directive would
have exhausted all the assets of the debtor's estate, the trustee,
after taking control of Quanta's property, notified the NJDEP and
its creditors of his intention to abandon the contaminated waste
oil and leasehold interest of the estate at the facility. 27 On May

20, 1983, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee authority to
proceed with the proposed abandonment.2 8 Since the abandonment issue raised in the New Jersey case was already pending
before the Third Circuit in the companion New York action, the
NJDEP, with consent of the other parties, filed a notice of appeal
directly with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.29
On appeal, the NJDEP argued that the trustee could not
abandon the burdensome property because of the statutorily-imthe environmental contamination at the
posed duty to cleanup
3
New Jersey site.

'

Relying on its decision in the New York case,

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that allowing
abandonment would be in derogation of state environmental
laws and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further
action.31
C.

Supreme Court Decision

The United States Supreme Court granted the trustee's petition for certiorari and consolidated the New York and New Jersey
actions.32 The trustee contended that section 554 placed no restrictions on his power to abandon property burdensome to the
estate or of inconsequential value. 3 Respondents NJDEP and
26 NJDEP, 739 F.2d 927, 928 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
27 Brief for Trustee, supra note 19, at 5.
28 NJDEP, 739 F.2d at 928.
29 Id. The appeal was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982) which provides:

Notwithstanding section 1482 of this title, a court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgment, order, or decree of an
appellate panel created under section 160 or a District court of the
United States or from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy
court of the United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a direct
appeal to the court of appeals.
28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982).
30 NJDEP, 739 F.2d at 928.

31 Id. at 928-29.
32 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207
(1985).
33 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,

498 n.2 (1986).
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New York, on the other hand, asserted that they had the authority to require a trustee in bankruptcy to assume the responsibility
of safeguarding the environment against the dangers posed by
the bankrupt's estate.3 4 Lastly, petitioner Midlantic National
Bank maintained that imposing cleanup duties on the trustee
would consume all of the funds otherwise available to secured
and unsecured creditors, thus constituting a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of the fifth
amendment. 5
Justice Powell, writing for a five member majority, declared
that the trustee's abandonment power under section 554 was
conditioned upon compliance with local laws designed to protect
the public health and welfare .3 6 The Court noted that "[b]efore
the 1978 revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or federal interests. 37
Thus, Justice Powell reasoned that when Congress enacted section 554, it presumably included the established judicially developed rule.3 ' The Court also found that Congress did not intend
section 554 to preempt the state laws referred to in section
959(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 3' That section obligates a
trustee to observe the requirements of all relevant state laws
while controlling and operating the property in question.4 0 The
34 Brief of Respondents State of New York and City of New York at 7-34,
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986)
(No. 84-801); Brief of Respondent New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 11-43, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 84-801) [hereinafter NJDEP Brief].
35 Midlantic Brief, supra note 9, at 11-15.
36 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506-07.
37 Id. at 500.
38 Id. at 501. There is no legislative history to § 554. The Court noted that
other courts recognized this judicially developed rule. See Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952) (trustee not permitted to abandon barges obstructing harbor traffic); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942)
(conditions imposed before abandonment permitted), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago
Junction R.R. v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). The Court further noted that one
bankruptcy decision recognized this rule. See In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 277 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (trustee required to spend estate funds to seal
manholes). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist found these decisions "particularly
unpersuasive." Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982)).
40 Section 959(b) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee,
receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the
United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager

19891

CAVEA T LENDER

Court concluded that:
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and
local laws. The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to
authorize an abandonment without formulating conditions
that will adequately protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question whether certain state
laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous
as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a
state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. 4 '
In a footnote to the holding and probably in response to the
stinging dissent of Justice Rehnquist, the Court noted that the exception it created to section 554 was a narrow one.4 2 Justice Powell
further stated that "[i]t does not encompass a speculative or indeterminant future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or
regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or
safety from imminent and identifiable harm."'43 As illustrated by the
cases which have interpreted and purportedly followed the Midlantic
rationale, that footnote has provided a fertile field for judicial
imagination.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist raised the issue with which later
courts would have to grapple. In doing so, he stated that:
The Court of Appeals, as I read its opinions in these cases,
apparently would require the trustee to expend all of Quanta's
available assets to cleanup the sites. But barring abandonment and forcing a cleanup would effectively place respondents' interest in protecting the public fisc ahead of the claims
of other creditors.44
The majority in Midlantic found support for its position from its
previous holding in Ohio v. Kovacs.4 5 In Kovacs, the Court stated in
dicta, that persons in possession of a contaminated site, including a
bankruptcy trustee, must comply with state environmental laws. 4 6
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is situated ....
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
41

Midlantic, 474

U.S. at 506-07 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 507 n.9.
Id.
Id. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 502 (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)).
46 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985).
42
43
44
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The Court, however, never determined how compliance could be
accomplished if estate assets were insufficient for that purpose.
In Kovacs, the State of Ohio obtained an injunction from an
Ohio State court to compel the operator of a hazardous waste disposal site to institute cleanup procedures, refrain from further contamination, and pay a specified amount of damages to the State.4 7
When Kovacs, the operator of the facility, made no attempt to comply with the-dictates of the injunction, the state court appointed a
receiver to oversee the disposition of the property. 48 Kovacs began
to comply with the injunction.4" Before the cleanup was completed,
however, he filed for bankruptcy.5" Ohio sought a declaration that
Kovacs' obligation to comply with the terms of the injunction was
not a dischargeable debt under the Bankruptcy Code.5 The
Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and held "that the cleanup order had been converted into an obligation to pay money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy."

52

Addressing the concern that the decision would impose severe
financial burdens on the states, Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Kovacs, noted that the states had recourse against the bankrupt's assets. 5 3 She explained that because Congress had left the
determination of the priority of interests in the debtor's property to
state law, a state could protect itself by according priority to its
claim against the bankrupt.5 4 A state could thus safeguard "its interest in the enforcement of its environmental laws by giving
cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims." 5 5
A general flaw in the Supreme Court's analysis in Midlantic is
that it failed to embrace many equitable factors implicated by the
controversy. The Court did not consider the total value of Quanta's
estate, the estimated cost of cleanup or the claims of creditors. A
thorough examination would have revealed that the bankrupt's
Id. at 276.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 276-77. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. V 1987) (describing discharge
exceptions).
52 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55 Id. New Jersey has enacted such a law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (f)
(West Supp. 1988). This new law would have enabled the NJDEP in Midlantic to
claim a first priority claim and lien paramount to all other claims and liens had the
NJDEP expended any funds to clean up the Edgewater site.
47
48
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property had a forced sale value of $428,000, the cost of cleanup
was considerably more than $2.5 million, and Midlantic alone had a
secured lien of over $643,000. Thus, disallowing abandonment
would prevent creditors from recouping any of their money while
only marginally benefiting the public. Moreover, the creditors who
would be burdened with the costs of cleanup were in no way responsible for the environmental violations. Yet the Supreme Court opinion, which did not directly address these issues, is certainly broad
enough to effectuate this result in future cases.
III.

SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS

The impact of the Midlantic decision has had far ranging, effects. The essence of the decision is that only in bankruptcy situations which pose an immediate and grave threat to the
environment will a trustee's abandonment power be subjugated
to environmental regulations. An analysis of subsequent decisions indicates, however, that the Midlantic rationale has been
twisted to suit the facts of particular cases, often with inconsistent
results.
The cases which have followed Midlantic fall into a number of
categories. Some have allowed abandonment in the face of environmental problems by distinguishing Midlantic. Other cases allow environmental cleanup costs as an administrative expense
with priority status. Still others have considered the effect of the
automatic stay of governmental actions to enforce pre-petition
and post-petition cleanup orders. Finally, a few cases have addressed the issue raised by Justice Rehnquist regarding which entity is responsible for the cleanup. Depending on the factual
situation presented, lower courts have found either solace in or
perplexion with the Midlantic decision and have reached results
which attempt to balance the equities of a particular case. Moreover, a number of cases address the realities of the matter by considering the assets available and the cost of environmental
cleanup.
Allow Abandonment

A.

The case of In re Franklin Signal Corp.5 6 required the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota to confront
precisely the dilemma identified by Justice Rehnquist in his
Midlantic dissent. In that case, the debtor manufactured burglar
56

65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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alarm systems at a leased facility in Wisconsin. 57 Prior to the filing of its chapter eleven petition, the debtor produced fourteen
drums of waste containing at least one chemical considered hazardous under Wisconsin law.5 8

Most of the assets of the estate (including the drums), were
subject to liens exceeding $268,000.5' The bankruptcy court had

previously approved the sale of certain assets subject to the
bank's lien and subsequently ordered that the proceeds be paid
over to the bank. 60 Following this sale, the estate consisted of
nearly $10,000 in cash, the drums of contaminated waste and two
uncollectible notes. 6 ' In addition to creditor claims, there were
at least $17,000 in administrative expenses, and the cost to rem6ve the hazardous waste was estimated at $20,000.62
The court approved the trustee's application to abandon the
fourteen drums of hazardous waste.63 In so doing, the court
strictly interpreted Midlantic, indicating that the Supreme Court's
decision was obviously based upon the fact that the trustee in
Midlantic took no action at all to safeguard the public from the
great danger created by the two processing facilities. 64 By contrast, the trustee in Franklin had conducted an investigation to
determine what hazardous substances were present in the drums
and informed the appropriate state agencies of the presence of
those hazardous substances. 65 The court interpreted the Midlantic decision to require courts to ask whether the trustee carried
out an investigation to determine what hazardous substances
burden the property and whether the trustee notified the appropriate state agency of the intention to abandon. 66 The court
noted that a case-by-case approach provides a more realistic solu57 Id. at 269.
58 Id. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources was apprised of the
problem. Id. at 269 n.l. No party has attempted to dispose of the hazardous substances contained in the drums. Id. The court noted that -[t]he logical inference of
the state's inaction is that the drums do not pose any imminent threat to the public." Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 269.
61 Id. at 269-70.
62 Id. at 270.
63 Id. at 273.
64 Id. at 271. The Franklin court reasoned: "I believe the Supreme Court intended only to place limits on a trustee's power of abandonment by holding that
the bankruptcy court cannot authorize the abandonment of property in contravention of state law unless conditions are formulated that will adequately protect the
public health and safety." Id. (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 273.
66 Id.
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tion to the underlying problems posed by Midlantic as opposed to
a strict reading that would bar any abandonment. 67 The court
also noted that the storage of the fourteen drums did not pose an
imminent danger to the public health and that the estate68 did not
have the requisite funds to carry out the cleanup CoStS.
In a complex factual setting, an Oklahoma bankruptcy court
allowed abandonment despite the presence of arguably the controlling principle in Midlantic. In In re Oklahoma Refining Co. ,69 the
owner of a refinery filed a chapter eleven petition.7 0 The court
subsequently appointed a trustee. 7' Because of environmental
concerns, the Oklahoma state agencies compelled the trustee to
terminate operations. 72 Like the Midlantic situation, the existing
environmental problems at the refinery were the result of many
years of crude oil refining at the site.73
When operations ceased, there were $40 million in secured
claims and $8 million in unsecured claims against the estate. 4
The estate was estimated to have approximately $4 million in assets. 75 The trustee worked with state agencies, employing a consulting firm to effectuate an environmental investigation of the
site and carried out certain cleanup steps costing $275,000.76
Although there was no additional generation of contaminants
following the appointment of the trustee, the environmental
agencies found hazardous substances in the ground which could
cause pollution at some indeterminate time in the future.7 7 The
bankruptcy court found that cleanup costs would be at least $2.5
million and that the site would require thirty years of monitoring. 78 As a result of the secured creditors' refusal to consent to

the appropriation of their cash collateral for the cleanup, the
trustee had no other assets at his disposal.79
The Oklahoma state agencies argued that all assets in the
hands of the trustee should be used for cleanup costs before they
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id.
63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
Id. at 562. The debtor's refinery was in operation since 1919. Id.

71
72

Id.

73
74
75
76

Id. at 563.

77
78
79

Id. at 562-63.
Id.
Id. Moreover, all of the estate's funds were cash collateral. See id.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id.
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were distributed to the secured claimants.8 ° Bankruptcy Judge
Bohanon addressed the issue and found the following:
The trustee thus finds himself confronted with a formidable dilemma. On one hand he has no funds which are not cash
collateral but, under a strict reading of Midlantic, could be required to comply with state laws and regulations which is impossible because of § 363(c)(2). We do not believe the
Supreme Court intended to place bankruptcy trustees in such
a predicament but rather that Midlantic requires the bankruptcy court, in determining whether to permit abandonment,
[to] take state environmental laws and regulations into
consideration.,
He then concluded:
To require strict compliance with State environmental
laws under the facts of this case could create a bankruptcy case
in perpetuity and fetter the estate to a situation without resolve. This trustee, with consent of the secured creditors, has
done what is reasonable under the circumstances. To preempt the administration of this estate would derogate the
spirit and purpose of the bankruptcy laws requiring prompt
and effectual administration within a limited time period. The
Oklahoma laws regarding environmental protection are not
unreasonable but juxtaposed to the Bankruptcy Code cannot
be reconciled to satisfy the strict compliance sought by the
State agencies.8 2
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit permitted abandonment in Borden,
Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.)."3 In Borden, the debtor filed a voluntary petition under chapter eleven of the
Bankruptcy Code and then attempted to sell one of its assets, a fertilizer plant located in Illinois.84 Unable to locate a buyer, the debtor
moved to abandon the property.8 5 In permitting abandonment, the
bankruptcy court declared that although the plant violated certain
state environmental laws, it did not pose an imminent danger to the
public.86 The court also noted that the debtor had no unencum80 Id. at 564-65. This, incidentally, was the NJDEP's position in Midlantic, but
the Supreme Court never reached that issue. See NJDEP Brief, supra note 34, at 1143.
81 In re Okla., 63 Bankr. at 565 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 565-66 (citation omitted).
83 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
84 Id. at 13-14
85 Id. Wells-Fargo Bank, the debtor's principal secured lender, agreed to provide post-petition financing. Id. When Smith-Douglass moved for abandonment,
Wells-Fargo supported its application. Id. at 14.
86 Id. at 14-15.
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bered assets with which to finance a cleanup.8 7 On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 8 8
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Fourth Circuit determined that its holding was consistent with the Midlantic decision. 89
The court reasoned that under Midlantic a court may allow abandonment when an environmental hazard consists only of an " 'indeterminant future violation.' -90 Additionally, the court noted that
the financial condition of the debtor was extremely relevant. 9 ' Finding that the debtor had no unencumbered assets and that the Illinois
plant did not pose a serious threat to the public safety, the court
permitted abandonment.9 2 Thus, despite the Midlantic Court's
holding to the contrary, insufficient estate assets, together with at
least an investigation and identification of the environmental problem, will provide a basis to permit abandonment without compliance
with either state law or cleanup orders.
B.

Cleanup Costs As An Administrative Expense

Another approach flowing from the Midlantic rationale is to
afford administrative priority for costs incurred by state environmental agencies or parties other than the debtor who have undertaken a cleanup effort. There is increasing case law
supporting this allowance of cleanup costs as an administrative
expense.9 3 In Juniper Development Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway
Transportation)94 the chapter seven trustee moved to dismiss a
complaint which sought equitable rescission of a contract to
purchase property from the debtor because of subsequently discovered environmental problems on the land.9 5 The bankruptcy
court denied the trustee's application and held that the purchaser's expenses were an administrative expense because the
property was an asset of the estate at the time the environmental
Id. at 15.
Id. The district court, contrary to the bankruptcy court, found that the financial condition of the debtor was irrelevant in deciding whether to allow abandonment. Id.
89 See id.
90 See id.(quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986)).
91 Id. at 17.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp.), 73 Bankr.
494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.),
70 Bankr. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987).
94 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
95 Id. at 496. The trustee also sought monetary damages. Id.
87
88
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cleanup expenses were incurred. 96
By definition, in order to be entitled to administrative priority, the expenses must be costs necessary to preserve an estate.97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a
case decided before Midlantic, held that cleanup costs incurred
pursuant to an administrative order would merely constitute an
unsecured claim not entitled to priority. 9 Following Midlantic,
however, courts have given such costs administrative priority.
For instance, the United States District Court for the District
of Maine decided that the cost of a post-petition cleanup of a prepetition environmental hazard constituted a first priority administrative expense. 99 The court found that the Midlantic decision
altered the criteria for determining administrative expenses. 0 0
Further, the court concluded that since the trustee was obligated
to comply with environmental laws regulating hazardous waste,
the estate was liable for the costs that the Maine Department of
Environmental Protection incurred in removing the waste as a
first priority administrative expense.' 0 ' Similarly, the court in In
re Pierce Coal and Construction, Inc. ,102 found that costs incurred in

the reclaiming of a mining area destroyed by the debtor-in-possession were entitled to administrative priority in order to protect the public safety.10 3 In so finding, the court viewed Midlantic
in the following light:
The United States Supreme Court has indicated in its decision
that where imminent and identifiable harm is present, the priorities of the Bankruptcy Code may be subservient to the environmental laws designed to protect the public safety. It is
reasonable to expect that under a given set of circumstances,
the necessary costs of protecting the public health or safety
from imminent and identifiable harm may be elevated to administrative priority and, perhaps, even to a type of secured
priority.' 0 4
Consistent with this reasoning, the court in In re Peerless Plating
96

Id. at 505.

97

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982).

98 See Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985).
99 In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 780 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).
100 Id. at 780-81.
101 Id.
102 65 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986).
103 Id. at 531. The court found that evidence of an identifiable harm did not
exist. Id.
104 Id.
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Co.," ° 5 approved federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
cleanup costs as an administrative expense based on the determination that the bankruptcy trustee was the site owner. 0 6 Significantly,
the court did not view the total depletion of estate assets for the
environmental cleanup costs sufficiently detrimental to other creditors to disallow the claim.'0 7 The court reasoned that Midlantic must
be read liberally, so that "[t]he fact that one claimant or creditor
10 8
receives the lion's share does not render that claim onerous."
C. Automatic Stay
In a different context, debtors often attempt to stop governmental efforts to compel cleanup. In one pre-Midlantic decision,
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources,' 0 9 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the automatic
stay does not apply to actions by governmental agencies pursuant
to its police and regulatory power." 0 In a later case citing
Midlantic, the court in United States v. F. E. Gregory & Sons, Inc.,"1
also refused to issue a stay which required reclamation work at an
abandoned mine site.' 12 In so doing, the court dismissed the
debtor's argument that it could simply abandon the site, and
stated that "[t]he argument is now foreclosed by a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection. The Court held that a
trustee may not abandon property in contravention of state environmental statutes and regulations.""' '
The Fifth Circuit provided a much more interesting discussion of that issue in In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. '" Again,
the question concerned whether the automatic stay prohibited
the federal government from enforcing an action to bring the
debtor into compliance with state and federal environmental
105

70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).

106

Id. at 948-49.

Id. at 947.
108 Id. See also In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987)
(state's response cost recoverable as administrative expense); In re Stevens, 68
Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (state agency entitled to costs for cleanup as administrative expense); In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.
1986) (state's cost for decontamination recoverable as an administrative expense).
109 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
107

'to Id. at 273.

111 58 Bankr. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
112
113

Id. at 592.
Id.

114 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987).
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Rejecting the debtor's contention that the enforcement

action was tantamount to a money judgment stayed by section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court observed that "in contemporary times, almost everything costs something."' "i 6 The court
reasoned that simply because an injunction will require the
debtor to expend funds
does not make it an action to enforce a
7
money judgment. " l
Taken to their logical conclusions, Commonwealth, Penn Terra,

and F. E. Gregory are authority for the proposition that an appropriate state environmental cleanup order requiring the expenditure of all of the debtor's assets, regardless of the claims of
secured and unsecured creditors, is not stayed by section 362.
This was precisely the result in In re Peerless Plating Co.,"

8

where

the EPA incurred considerable expenses in performing environmental cleanup work at a site of the debtor's former operations. 1 9 In approving the EPA's application to compel the
debtor to pay cleanup expenses, the court noted that any discussion regarding abandonment, administrative expenses, and the
duty of an estate to cleanup hazardous wastes must start with the
Midlantic requirement that the trustee comply with all environmental12 0 obligations.' 2 ' The court made this determination de-

spite its recognition that the trustee's compliance with CERCLA
122
could deplete the estate entirely.
Consistent with this rationale, a district court reached a similar conclusion in the recent case of United States v. Mattiace Industries, Inc. 123 In Mattiace, the EPA brought an action to recover

cleanup costs under the Superfund statute. 124 The court held
that such cleanup expenses were exempt from the automatic stay
provision of section 362 because Superfund was not enacted for
115 In re Commonwealth, 805 F.2d at 1182.
116 Id. at 1186 (quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733

F.2d 267, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1984)).
117 Id. (quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d

267, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1984)).
118 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
"19 Id. at 945.
120 The environmental cleanup at issue concerned the debtor's obligations pur-

suant to the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation & Liability
Act (CERCLA). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. IV 1986) (federal statute pro-

viding for removal of hazardous waste).
121
122
123
124

In re Peerless, 70 Bankr. at 946.

Id.
73 Bankr. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 816. The EPA sought recovery of cleanup costs under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9604(a), (c), 9606(a), (b), 9607(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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financial reasons, but to protect the public's health, safety and
welfare. 25 The court observed that enforcement of regulatory
statutes, despite requiring expenditures of estate (and therefore
creditor) assets, is not stayed under section 362.126
The practical effect of an environmental cleanup order on
the ability of a debtor to bring a chapter seven case to a conclusion is exemplified by Ohio v. Commercial Oil Service, Inc. (In re Commercial Oil Service, Inc.).

127

In a unique twist, the trustee of a

chapter seven debtor sought to dismiss the bankruptcy petition. 128 The trustee made this application after the court denied
his motion to stay a pending state court action to compel the
debtor to comply with the state's environmental protection
laws.' 29 Rather than impose the burden of the cleanup on the
trustee, the court dismissed the chapter seven petition.13 0 The
court noted that Midlantic obligated the trustee to cleanup the
site, by explaining that "[t]he Supreme Court in its recent decisions has clearly stated that the Trustee has an affirmative duty to
make the hazardous waste site comply with state laws." ''3 The
court also recognized that since the trustee was not familiar with
hazardous waste disposal, and since both federal and state authorities have more expertise, they were in a much better
posi13 2
tion to take control of the site and remove the waste.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Needless to say, these decisions do not lend comfort to financial institutions or other lenders to businesses which are subject to comprehensive state and federal environmental laws. It is
apparent that when the trustee in bankruptcy attempts to identify
the environmental problems, notify the appropriate parties and
take steps to prevent imminent danger, lower courts will permit
125 M1attiace, 73 Bankr. at 819.
126 Id. at 818. Similar results are found in pre-M'idlantic cases. See, e.g., United
States v. ILCO, Inc. (In re Ilco, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); In re
Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979). But see Thomas Solvent
Co. v. Kelley (In re Thomas Solvent Co.), 44 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984)
(enforcing an automatic stay on the condition that the case be converted to a chapter seven proceeding).
127 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
128 Id. at 312.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 316-18.
131 Id. at 317 (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)).
132 Id. at 317.
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abandonment and leave environmental compliance to others.
The Midlantic decision, however, can also be read to allow state
environmental laws to take precedence over all other interests.

